Harvest Now, Decrypt Later
Adversaries are archiving encrypted traffic today. Once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists — estimated 2028–2033 — that data becomes readable. The risk is not future. It is already accumulating.
EU PQC roadmap: national strategies by end-2026, high-risk use cases migrated by end-2030, the rest by 2035. Most organisations don’t know what cryptography they’re running. We find it, map it to DORA and NIST FIPS 203/204/205, and deliver in five business days.
| Observed cipher / protocol | Classification | Post-quantum exposure | FIPS standard mandate | Severity status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSA-2048 | Signature & KEM | Vulnerable to Shor's algorithm (HNDL target) | Replace with ML-KEM / ML-DSA | CRITICAL |
| TLS 1.2 | Transport layer | No hybrid PQC key-exchange support | Mandate TLS 1.3 RFC 8446 | HIGH |
| ECDHE-RSA | Key exchange suite | considered quantum-vulnerable (NIST PQC) via discrete-log attacks | Transition to X25519MLKEM768 | HIGH |
| ML-KEM-768 | Lattice-based KEM | Quantum-resistant lattice security margin | NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) | INFO |
Adversaries are archiving encrypted traffic today. Once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists — estimated 2028–2033 — that data becomes readable. The risk is not future. It is already accumulating.
DORA applies since 17 January 2025. Poland’s KSC (NIS2 transposition) went live on 3 April 2026. Art. 9 and Art. 21(2)(h) reference cryptographic controls directly. An examiner can ask for your cryptographic inventory today.
DigiCert Quantum Readiness study: most regulated organisations have not moved to quantum-safe encryption. Most do not know where RSA or ECC is used in their systems. You cannot migrate what you cannot see.
Passive TLS fingerprinting, a walk through the certificate-transparency logs, and inspection of security headers. No active probing. No payload injection.
We build a Cryptographic Bill of Materials — every algorithm, certificate and protocol we can see, mapped against NIST FIPS 203/204/205 and your DORA register.
Executive summary (3–6 pages) plus technical report (15–40 pages). Operator-reviewed against the raw scan data before it is sent, dated, and structured so it can go straight into your ICT risk register.
50 employees, UKNF Payment Institution. Modern GCP stack. 9-month remediation roadmap.
DORA / KNF / BaFin supervised
You need DORA Art. 9-10 traceability, per-finding FIPS mapping, and a PDF structured for your ICT risk register.
NIS2 / GDPR scope / other
You need to understand your cryptographic posture ahead of NIS2 Art. 21(2)(h) obligations.
Our deliverable maps each finding to DORA Articles 9 and 10 and to NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205. It is compatible with EBA Guidelines on ICT and Security Risk Management (EBA/GL/2025/02) and the KNF Rekomendacja D format. Final regulatory acceptance is, as always, the supervisor's prerogative; our role is to provide the audit trail.
We do not certify on behalf of NIST or ENISA. We apply the published FIPS 203, FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 standards (effective 14 August 2024) and the ENISA Post-Quantum Cryptography current-state guidance to your environment, with citations in every finding.
SandboxAQ is a continuous monitoring product. We are a one-shot, fixed-fee assessment producing a PDF structured for your ICT risk register. Many clients run both: AQtive for posture, us for the regulatory audit deliverable.
Because if a fintech in 2026 has fewer than three actionable PQC findings, your environment is genuinely ready and you should not have paid us in the first place.
Yes. Executive summary and technical body are available in English, Polish, German and Russian. Both versions are signed and dated. Default is English; specify another language in the intake form.